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Abstract—Software updates are critical to the performance,
compatibility, and security of software systems. However, users do
not always install updates, leaving their machines vulnerable to
attackers’ exploits. While recent studies have highlighted numer-
ous reasons why users ignore updates, little is known about how
prevalent each of these beliefs is. Gaining a better understanding
of the prevalence of each belief may help software designers better
target their efforts in understanding what specific user concerns
to address when developing and deploying software updates. In
our study, we performed a survey to quantify the prevalence of
users’ reasons for not updating uncovered by previous studies.
We used this data to derive three factors underlying these beliefs:
update costs, update necessity, and update risks. Based on our
results, we provide recommendations for how software developers
can better improve users’ software updating experiences, thereby
increasing compliance and, with it, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software updates are essential to keeping systems and
programs up-to-date. These updates fix bugs and bring about
improvements in performance and usability; but arguably their
most important function is enhancing system security by fixing
vulnerabilities. In 2015 alone, Microsoft reported 3,300 vulner-
ability disclosures of varying threat levels and estimated that
close to a quarter of Windows Personal Computers (PCs) were
not always protected and updated to the latest patch level [19].
Similarly, Cisco suggested that most security exploits will
continue to be propagated by outdated software that contains
known vulnerabilities [4]. Therefore, these companies and
security agencies—such as the United States Computer Emer-
gency Readiness Team [30]—recommend that users install
software updates as soon as they become available, in order
to protect systems from being exploited by attackers. In fact,
applying updates in a timely manner is one of the few pieces
of computer security advice on which experts agree [15].
However, recent studies have shown that users avoid or
delay installing software updates [31], [32], [18], [29], [10],
[17] and uncovered some of the reasons that users offer for
this behavior. While these studies make a timely contribution
to aid software developers, they are primarily qualitative. As a
result, we know very little about the prevalence of these beliefs.
Given that beliefs shape behavior [1], understanding exactly
how widespread these beliefs are will help software developers
and security professionals more efficiently understand how
to address users’ concerns and improve the overall software
updating experience, and ultimately, affect security.
In our study, we conducted a survey to better understand
how updating beliefs vary among the general population,
and investigate whether they can be grouped into actionable
factors for the community. We contribute to the literature on
software updating behaviors by quantifying the prevalence
of various beliefs about software updates, as uncovered by
the previous qualitative literature. Our analysis uncovers three
distinct factors that highlight why users claim to avoid updates:
• Update Costs: These costs include the time it takes to
install the update, whether a restart is required, and its
required space on disk.
• Update Necessity: This includes users’ satisfaction with
the current system or program, whether the update’s
purpose is clear, and its perceived importance.
• Update Risks: These risks include data loss due to the
update, and whether the update may be malicious.
We interpret and discuss our results, highlighting broad
implications these have for developers who design software
updates for users. Understanding these unifying factors may
help guide developers towards improving the updating experi-
ence through better software design and messaging.
II. RELATED WORK
Failure to patch known security vulnerabilities is one of
the leading causes for security breaches; most exploits target
systems that have not been patched, rather than undisclosed
zero-days [4]. This impacts both end-users and system ad-
ministrators: for instance, the recent Equifax data breach, the
largest of its kind, was as a result of a system administrator’s
failure to apply a software update [21]. This update fixed a
known vulnerability and had been available for several months.
Thus, ensuring that people update their systems in a timely
fashion would help in improving computer security.
Only recently have security researchers begun exploring
how users feel about and respond to software updates. Ion et
al. [15] compared the advice expert and non-expert computer
users gave in order to stay protected online. They found
that non-experts installed updates less frequently and lacked
awareness about the importance of updates. In a somewhat
representative sample of the US, Wash and Rader [33] found
that only 24.2% of users reported taking “advanced” security
actions—including installing software updates and patches—
frequently. Traces of update habits of Android users have
shown that only about 50% of all users update to a new
application version within the first week of the update’s
release [22]. Software developers have also been shown to not
update third-party libraries after first use [7].
A related set of studies have explored in greater depth
why users avoid or delay installing software updates. Rader
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
04
59
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
1 M
ay
 20
18
and Wash [34] found that automatic updates that try to
involve users in the decision-making process lead to poor
mental models of updating and result in less secure systems.
Vaniea et al. [32] interviewed 37 Windows users and found
that they cited three reasons for avoiding updates: updates
introduced undesirable features, the value and purpose of an
update was hard to assess, and the need for updating was
unclear because the software/program functioned correctly.
Mathur and Chetty [17] found that users who have negative
experiences with software updating disabled auto-updates on
Android devices.
In a survey of 155 users, Fagan et al. [9] explored software
update notifications and found design features that led to
annoying and confusing messages. Mathur et al. [18] inter-
viewed 30 users and found they felt annoyed with notifications
that interrupted their tasks, including having to restart their
machines. They described software updating as an “informa-
tion problem,” highlighting the different pieces and sources
of information users sought before updating, including the
source of the update and the duration of the install process.
Forget et al. [10] compared the level of end-user engagement
in the management of their computers’ security with security
outcomes and discovered that greater engagement did not
always correspond to greater security. The authors uncovered a
variety of reasons why users avoid or delay updates, confirming
the results of previous studies [32], [31], [34]. They suggested
that security mitigations, such as software updating, need
to be designed according to how much users engage with
computer security. Vaniea and Rashidi [31] surveyed 307 users
about their experiences with updating software and highlighted
various user experiences at each step of the process.
Our study builds on this previous work, which uncovered
users’ underlying beliefs about updating their software, by
measuring the prevalence of these various beliefs. Our study
uses this to offer practical recommendations for software
developers to consider when developing and designing updates
in order to deliver a better user experience.
III. METHOD
A. Survey Construction and Deployment
We first surveyed the literature on why users avoid software
updates, noting each belief we came across. Not only does the
existing literature provide a breadth of users’ beliefs about
avoiding updates, but also validates it with actual behav-
ior [10], [32]—that is, users leaving their systems unpatched—
in many studies. We discovered a total of 15 different beliefs
relating to software updates:
B1-Fine: Updates seem unnecessary because everything
works fine [32], [29], [31]
B2-Time: Updates take a long time to install [18], [31]
B3-Restart: Updates require unnecessary restarts of appli-
cations or PCs [34], [18], [10], [31]
B4-Unused: Updates are requested by programs used in-
frequently [32], [31], [18], [10]
B5-Unimportant: Updates seem unimportant [18], [10],
[32]
B6-Purpose: The purpose of updates is unclear and hard
to understand [18]
B7-Bundled: Updates introduce unwanted bundled pro-
grams [31]
B8-Features: Updates add unwanted or remove wanted
features from programs [31]
B9-Bugs: Updates introduce new bugs into programs [29],
[18]
B10-Space: Updates occupy a lot of disk space [18], [31]
B11-Compatibility: Updates cause compatibility issues be-
tween programs [18], [31]
B12-UI: Updates disrupt program user interfaces [32],
[31], [18], [10]
B13-DataCost: Updates consume a lot of data on Internet
plans [18]
B14-Malicious: Updates contain malicious software [18],
[31]
B15-DataLoss: Updates lead to a loss of data [31]
We compiled these beliefs into a survey where we asked
participants how often, in their experience, each one of these
statements about software updates were true. (Respondents
rated their beliefs on a five-point scale, from “rarely” to
“always.”) We chose not to ask about any specific updating
experience (such as specific devices or operating systems), to
avoid bias from any recent or otherwise memorable experience.
We wanted to collect opinions that people have come to hold
about software updates in general, as these would color users’
interactions with any new software update. In addition to the
ratings, we collected participants’ demographic information:
age, gender, and (if available) occupation.
We recruited participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT), an online work marketplace that has been shown to
produce diverse and generally representative samples of the
population [3]. We limited the survey to only those AMT
users who were based in the United States (US) and had a
completion rate of 95% or greater. Sampling high-reputation
AMT users ensured we did not have to resort to attention check
questions [24]. The survey took between 5-10 minutes, and
participants were compensated $2 for their time. The beliefs
were randomized for each AMT user to avoid any potential
ordering bias.
We also launched the survey on Google Consumer Surveys
(GCS) to compare the prevalence of these beliefs across two
samples. Because the number of questions in our survey (15)
exceeded the maximum number of questions GCS allows in
a survey (10), we placed each question in a survey by itself.
GCS participants were compensated with Play Store credit.
This study was approved by our Institutional Review Board.
B. Data Analysis
The beliefs we compiled cover a wide range of the updating
process’s aspects, and we wanted to uncover any underlying
themes that potentially unified multiple beliefs. Rather than
grouping the beliefs thematically, based on our own subjec-
tive judgments, we decided to perform principal component
analysis (PCA) [14] with Varimax rotation on the responses
of participants from our AMT sample. This technique has
previously been used extensively in psychology and human-
computer interaction literature [28], [16], [25], [12], as it
yields more descriptive factors which are robust to correlation.
However, we also confirmed our factor loadings using an
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Demographic AMT Participants GCS Participants
Age
18–24 2.49% 14.58%
25–34 40.80% 20.56%
35–44 30.85% 15.54%
45–54 11.94% 12.47%
55–64 8.46% 11.70%
>= 65 5.47% 8.57%
Gender
Male 58.71% 42.97%
Female 41.29% 42.23%
Other 0.00% 14.8%
Education
12th grade or less 1.49% NA
High school 12.44% NA
Some college 17.91 NA
Bachelor’s 45.27% NA
Associate’s 12.94% NA
Post-graduate 9.45% NA
Prefer not to answer 0.50% NA
TABLE I: Demographic Information of the Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk (AMT) and Google Consumer Survey Participants
(GCS). GCS does not report data about participants’ education
levels.
Oblimin rotation. The resulting dimensionality reduction helps
unveil which beliefs are frequently held together, and allows
us to explore the factors underlying why users avoid updating
their software.
Because we were interested in factors resulting from the
prevalence of a belief (and not its strengths), we transformed
the original belief scores—measured on a 5-point scale—to
a binary variable for our analysis. We encoded “never (1),”
“rarely (2),” and “sometimes (3)” as 0—indicating that users
did not hold that belief, and encoded “often (4)” and “always
(5)” as 1—indicating that users held that belief.
IV. FINDINGS
We received 200 complete responses from AMT and, on
average, close to 200 responses for each belief on GCS. Our
participants were roughly balanced in gender and age; detailed
demographics can be seen in Table I.
A. Comparing the Two Samples
We first compared the AMT and GCS responses, conduct-
ing a Mann-Whitney U test to examine whether participants’
beliefs differed across samples; because we conducted 15 such
tests, we applied the Bonferroni correction, and therefore only
report significance at p < 0.003. The distributions of the
beliefs across the two samples are presented in Figure 1.
We found that both samples were mostly in agreement with
respect to their beliefs. The differences between AMT and
GCS responses were statistically significant for four of the
software updating beliefs [B7 (r = 0.22), B12 (r = 0.17),
B14 (r = 0.20), B15 (r = 0.17)], with small (r = 0.1) to
medium (r = 0.3) effect sizes [5]. Participants in the GCS
sample had a stronger belief that:
• updates introduce unwanted bundled programs into soft-
ware (B7),
• updates disrupt the user interface of programs (B12),
• updates contain malicious software (B14), and
• updates lead to a loss of data (B15).
For all other beliefs, we found no significant differences in
prevalence between the two samples.
As described above, the limitations of the GCS platform
required us to ask about each belief in a separate survey. These
surveys are anonymous, preventing us from examining beliefs
across individuals. The GCS sample therefore serves primarily
as evidence of the AMT sample’s external validity, and we
focus the remainder of our analysis on our AMT participants.
(Prior work has already shown that results from AMT are
consistent with those of laboratory experiments [23], [13],
and that AMT samples “produce reliable results with standard
decision-making biases” [11].)
B. Exploratory Factor Analysis
In our dataset, we found five eigenvalues greater than 1.0
(the Kaiser criterion [8]), suggesting the presence of up to
five factors. We also verified the presence of these five factors
using a scree plot (see Figure 2). Together, these five factors
explained 62% of the variance in the data. Subsequently, we
extracted these five factors using a PCA, applied a Varimax
rotation and considered a belief loaded on a factor if its loading
exceeded 0.5. We ignored an item if it loaded on a factor, but
its loading on that factor was not twice as high as its loading
on the other factors [26]. These factor loadings are presented
in Table II.
After this step, we ignored beliefs B4, B7, B8, B9, B11,
and B12, as they failed to load predominantly on a single
factor. We note that this does not reflect the importance of
these beliefs, but only that they are not strongly correlated
or that they are held at equal rates by the population. This
is a necessary step for PCA, providing a more reliable basis
to draw conclusions from, as leaving in individual questions
would cause too much bias.
Left with the remaining 9 beliefs, we repeated the PCA,
Varimax rotation, and computed the new loadings. We ex-
tracted three factors explaining 56% of the variance in the data.
The output of this step is shown in Table III. We emphasize
again that we could not repeat this analysis on the GCS sample
since those participants were not the same across the GCS
survey questions (i.e., each GCS participant only answered a
single question).
The process left us with three distinct factors, each repre-
senting 2–4 beliefs. We gave each of the factors names based
on the ideas that unify the beliefs that loaded onto them:
• Update Necessity: These beliefs concern failing to under-
stand why updates are required and what purpose they
serve:
◦ B1 (“Updates seem unnecessary as everything works
fine”)
◦ B5 (“Updates seem unimportant”)
◦ B13 (“Updates consume a lot of data on Internet
plans”)
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Fig. 1: The distribution of software updating beliefs from both the Amazon Mechanical Turk and Google Consumer Surveys
samples.
Fig. 2: Scree plot indicating the number of factors we discov-
ered during the Exploratory Factor Analysis.
• Update Costs: These beliefs represent the costs users
incur while updating (whether they be time, resources,
etc.):
◦ B2 (“Updates take a long time to install”)
◦ B3 (“Updates require unnecessary restarts of applica-
tions or PCs”)
◦ B10 (“Updates occupy a lot of disk space”)
• Update Risks: These beliefs represent risks faced during
or after updating:
◦ B14 (“Updates contain malicious software”)
◦ B15 (“Updates lead to a loss of data”)
C. Prevalence of Beliefs
We calculated the percentage of AMT participants whose
beliefs were described by each of the factors: for the beliefs
comprising each factor, we took the average Likert score,
and then applied the same threshold we used for PCA. In
Belief Fac. 1 Fac. 2 Fac. 3 Fac. 4 Fac. 5
B3-Restart 0.651
B8-Features 0.620 0.363
B7-Bundled 0.582 0.397
B2-Time 0.581
B4-Unused 0.509 0.345
B9-Bugs 0.455 0.452
B1-Fine 0.840
B5-Unimport. 0.794
B6-Purpose 0.629
B14-Malicious 0.785
B15-DataLoss 0.761
B12-UI 0.407 0.357 0.461
B13-DataCost 0.866
B11-Compatib. 0.551 0.524
B10-Space 0.790
TABLE II: Factor loadings from the first PCA with Varimax
rotation. Only loadings >0.25 are shown.
this manner, we observed that 40.5% of participants held
beliefs about Update Costs, 29.2% held beliefs about Update
Necessity, and 7.5% held beliefs about Update Risks.
To examine discriminant validity between the three factors,
we performed a Spearman correlation. We observed that while
the three factors were inter-correlated, these correlations are
not very strong: r = 0.478 when comparing Updating Costs
with Updating Risks, r = 0.487 when comparing Updating
Necessity with Updating Risks, and r = 0.597 when comparing
Updating Necessity with Updating Costs. Thus, participants
may have beliefs relating to one factor, but not others.
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Belief Necessity Costs Risks
B1-Fine 0.779
B5-Unimportant 0.743 0.318
B13-DataCost 0.546
B2-Time 0.745
B3-Restart 0.709
B10-Space 0.536
B14-Malicious 0.819
B15-DataLoss 0.810
TABLE III: Factor loadings from the second PCA with Vari-
max rotation, after removing beliefs that did not load at least
twice as highly on a single factor during the previous PCA.
Only loadings >0.25 are shown.
D. Limitations
A limitation of our study is that we did not follow-up our
exploratory factor analysis with a confirmatory one. Future
research could replicate our analyses and validate the factors
we found. Our results are also generalizable only to the AMT
population. However, we supplemented our sample from AMT
with another from GCS to provider a comparison of the beliefs.
Further, while the AMT population is limited in how diverse it
is, research [2], [27] has shown that it is similar to university
students and other online participant pools. Future studies may
also wish to replicate our results with larger sample sizes. We
note, however, that we verified that our participant-to-item ratio
(200/15 = 13:1) was within the bounds considered sufficient
for exploratory factor analysis as shown by a meta study [6].
V. DISCUSSION
The ultimate goal of any research on software updates is
to make users more secure by increasing the number of out-
of-date systems that get patched. Our research contributes to
this goal by increasing our community’s understanding of the
reasons why people do not update their systems.
A. Software Updating Beliefs
Our study is the first, to our knowledge, to quantify the
frequency with which various beliefs about updating appear
in the population. We found that most people expressed
agreement with nearly all of the reasons for avoiding software
updates uncovered by previous studies, to varying degrees
(see Figure 1). Except for narrow concerns (e.g., platform-
specific), such as mobile data usage, and ones whose dangers
have not been widely advertised (updates containing malicious
software), the majority of respondents said each reason was at
least sometimes true.
Respondents found certain aspects of the updating process
especially annoying. About 40% of the AMT and GCS sample
stated that updates either “often” or “always” required un-
necessary restarts. Similarly, the duration of the installation
process was another frequent complaint, expressed by nearly
40% of both the AMT and the GCS respondents, who said
that this was either “often” or “always” a problem.
B. Factors from Beliefs
In addition to the prevalence of individual beliefs, our
analysis uncovered several unifying factors. This finding sug-
gests that, rather than holding an assortment of distinct and
disconnected opinions, people subscribe to “packages” of
beliefs about software updating. These represent three distinct
axes along which users’ concerns are expressed.
The first is Update Necessity. Many respondents were
unconvinced of the need for updates, agreeing that they “seem
unimportant” because “everything works fine.” An orthogonal
issue was the toll updates impose on users, which we refer to
as Update Costs. They take time and disk space, and interrupt
users’ workflow when they demand a restart. Finally, some
worried about Update Risks, bad things that may happen if an
update goes wrong: lost data or worse.
C. Implications for Software Developers
1) Update Messaging: Our results suggest that one rela-
tively low-cost way of getting users to install updates is by
solving the information problem, i.e., accompanying updates
with better messages. Currently, software updates typically
present the same generic information about themselves to every
user. These often lack concrete information and do not directly
address users’ inherent reservations and beliefs about updating.
The dominant factors identified by our study suggest con-
crete topics update messaging can address. For example, to
address beliefs about Update Necessity, developers can clarify
the purpose specific updates serve, explaining that they may
be important even if everything is working fine. This point
is especially critical to make in the case of security updates,
which often fix problems that users are unlikely to even be
aware of.
As another example, to address beliefs about Update Costs,
developers can clarify how users might be impacted (e.g., the
duration of the installation process) during the time of the up-
date, and what if any, steps they need to take before installing
the update for their specific operating system. Conversely, if
an update does not require a cost to end-users and runs in the
background, the update message can clarify that. Future work
could test these messages by means of controlled experiments.
2) Designing and Deploying Updates: Beyond simply
messaging, developers should take these factors into account
when designing software and updating mechanisms. Thus, as
the necessity of restarting is a common complaint, and a
major contributor to Update Costs, systems that apply updates
silently and in the background would be welcomed by users.
Developers can take further steps to reduce their users’
Update Risks. By using secure and verifiable updating mech-
anisms, they can reduce the possibility of malicious updates.
And by rigorous testing, the risk of data loss can be reduced.
Many modern systems have turned to automatic updates,
which has has proven to be an effective and successful sys-
tem [20]. In cases where this is not an option, it is to the
benefit of both parties for software developers to be able to
convince their users to install updates. For this to happen, a
solid understanding of people’s current beliefs, such as that
established by this study, is a fundamental prerequisite.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We used a large scale survey to measure the prevalence of
different beliefs users have about software updates that were
discovered by previous qualitative literature [32], [29], [31],
[34], [18], [10]. We found that these beliefs can be grouped into
three factors that each represent a different facet of the beliefs:
Update Necessity, Update Costs, Update Risks. These factors
provide several practical recommendations for how software
developers can improve existing update systems, including how
and which of these previously discovered beliefs should be
targeted and addressed.
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